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Model checking as a protective method against spurious actuation of
industrial control systems
A. Pakonen & K. Bjo¨rkman
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd, Espoo, Finland
ABSTRACT: A spurious actuation of an industrial instrumentation and control (I&C) system is a failure
mode where a system component inadvertently performs a function without a justified reason to do so. Design
issues leading to such failures are very difficult to analyze, but pose a high risk for safety. Model checking is
a formal verification method, that can enable – through exhaustive analysis against stated properties – 100%
coverage against spurious actuation scenarios, as well. In this paper, we introduce a modeling approach for
the verification of I&C system application logic design. We then discuss the verification of properties related
to spurious actuation, in particular. Finally, we present data collected from customer projects VTT has carried
out in the Finnish nuclear industry. About 37% of the design issues we have identified are related to spurious
actuation, proving that model checking can effectively be used as a protective method against such scenarios.
1 INTRODUCTION
“If the pressure gets too high, an emergency relief
valve shall be automatically opened.” Given such a
requirement, a test engineer should have little trou-
ble coming up with a suitable verification plan. But
actually, a more critical statement might be the coun-
terpoint: “The emergency relief valve shall never be
opened unless it is absolutely necessary”. Given such
a requirement to verify, where does one even start?
Spurious actuation is defined as a failure mode
where an actuation of an I&C function occurs without
a real demand (Authe´n et al. 2016). The terms “inad-
vertent operation” or “active failure” are also used.
By their nature, such failures are more complex to an-
alyze than “failure to actuate”. Spurious actuation can
be caused by any failure between the process mea-
surement sensors and the actuators, including erro-
neous operator command (Authe´n et al. 2016). In this
paper, however, we focus on failures caused by design
issues in the I&C system application logic.
One of the safety design principles in nuclear
power plants (NPPs) is defense in depth – establish-
ment of several successive physical barriers for con-
taining accidents. Still, spurious actuation of a safety
I&C system is a hazard that can potentially challenge
more than one barrier simultaneously (IAEA 2015).
The common position of several nuclear regulators
(2015) is that safety of systems “cannot be discussed
and shown to exist” without accurate descriptions of
system architecture, hardware, software, models of
postulated accidents, etc., and that those descriptions
“must include unintended systems behaviour”. Sev-
eral regulators also agree that spurious actuation is
of “particular concern from a safety standpoint”, and
“has the potential to place a given plant into an unsafe
operation condition that is not bounded by the plant’s
safety analysis” (MDEP 2016).
One NPP design principle that can be used to deal
with spurious actuation is diversity – adding another,
different I&C system, and then voting on control ac-
tions. Still, aside from emphasizing good principles
like defense in depth, single failure tolerance, quality,
independence and qualification (IAEA 2015), there
remains a challenge: How the ensure that I&C sys-
tems do not contain design errors that might lead to
spurious actuation? Modern I&C systems are so com-
plex, in terms of both hardware and software (plat-
form and application), that 100% test coverage is
practically impossible.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First,
after discussing basic aspects of model checking in
Section 2, we introduce a modeling approach devel-
oped for the verification of I&C system application
logic in Section 3. Second, we discuss the semantics
of and relationships between different types of for-
mal properties that deal with spurious actuation in
Section 4. Third, in Section 5, we present data on
design issues identified in VTT’s practical customer
projects, to support our argument that model check-
ing is a powerful method for analyzing spurious actu-




Model checking is a formal verification method by
which a desired property of a (hardware or software)
system is verified over a system model through ex-
haustive enumeration of all the reachable states and
possible behaviors (Clarke et al. 1999). When the
design fails to satisfy a desired property, the model
checker (a software tool used for analysis) produces a
counterexample that demonstrates a behavior that vi-
olates the property.
The key challenge in model checking is the state
space explosion problem. For systems with many in-
teracting components or data structures that can as-
sume many different values, the number of possible
states to enumerate through becomes too enormous
(Clarke et al. 1999). One solution is to use symbolic
representation of the state space. Binary Decision Di-
agrams (BDD) provide a canonical representation for
boolean formulas, and allow for verification of sys-
tems that would be impossible to handle using explicit
state enumeration (Burch et al. 1992). Another solu-
tion is to use Boolean (or propositional) satisfiabil-
ity (SAT) solvers to perform bounded model check-
ing, where the length of state transition sequences is
limited (Clarke et al. 2001).
NuSMV (Cimatti et al. 2002), a popular open
source model checker, is one example of a BDD
and SAT-based verification tool. The system model
is written as a type of Finite State Machine (FSM).
NuSMV is based on discrete time, but continuous
time model checkers are also available (e.g., UPPAAL
(Behrmann et al. 2004)).
2.2 Property specification
Formal properties are often divided into different
types: safety properties dictate that something “bad”
will not happen, and liveness dictate that something
“good” must eventually happen (Lamport 1977).
More accurately, we can distinguish between these
two types by the fact that a finite execution of a system
cannot violate a liveness property (since it is always
possible that the “good” thing might occur later). On
the other hand, an execution that violates a safety
property is always limited, and there is an identifi-
able point where the “bad” thing occurs (Alpern and
Schneider 1985). The kind of properties that deal with
spurious actuation are therefore safety properties.
For model checking, the properties are usually
specified using temporal logic, a formalism that de-
scribes sequences of transitions between states in a
system (Clarke et al. 1999). Languages such as Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computational Tree Logic
(CTL) utilize temporal operators, such as (using no-
tation from (Clarke et al. 1999)):
• X p : p is true in the next state of the path.
• G p : p is true at every state on the path.
• F p : p is true at some future state on the path.
• p U q : q is true at some future state, and at every
preceding state on the path, p is true.
In these expressions, p and q are atomic proposi-
tions, logical formulas (referring to system variables)
that will either be true or false in any system state.
It is often also convenient to be able to refer to
past states. Past LTL operators have been suggested
by, e.g., Benedetti and Cimatti (2003), and the fol-
lowing operators are also among those supported by
tools such as NuSMV:
• Y p : p holds in the previous state on the path.
• O p : p is true at some past (or the current) state
on the path.
CTL is based on branching time, adding path quan-
tifiers A (“for all computation paths”) and E (“for
some computation path”).
3 VERIFICATION OF I&C SYSTEMS IN
PRACTICE
3.1 Practical experience
Since 2008, VTT has applied model checking in prac-
tical customer projects in the Finnish nuclear industry.
Our clients include (but are not limited to) the nuclear
regulator and two utilities.
For the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Au-
thority (STUK), we have evaluated the Protection
System and the Priority and Actuation Control Sys-
tem of the Olkiluoto 3 NPP under construction. Both
systems are based on Areva’s TELEPERM XS plat-
form, with the latter system based on Field Pro-
grammable Gate Array (FPGA) technology. For For-
tum Power and Heat, VTT has performed indepen-
dent, third-party verification of application functions
related to, e.g., reactor protection, in the NPP I&C
renewal projects LARA (Pakonen et al. 2014) and
ELSA. ELSA systems are based on Rolls-Royce’s
Spinline platform. Finally, for Fennovoima, the future
operator of the Hanhikivi NPP, VTT has evaluated the
functional architecture of I&C systems.
3.2 I&C application logic modeling
VTT has developed a graphical tool (Pakonen et al.
2013) called MODCHK for verifying I&C applica-
tion logic1 designs, based on the NuSMV model
checker.
1While the tool is intended for modeling function block dia-
grams, we discuss the verification of application logic rather than
software, because we have also worked with FPGA logic, which
is not software.
The tool is based on a manually constructed library
of basic (elementary) function block elements. Man-
ual modeling is necessary, since nuclear system ven-
dors often use vendor-specific function blocks, and
do not provide the source code implementation, only
functional descriptions (Pakonen et al. 2013).
An example of an elementary function block speci-
fied in NuSMV’s input language is shown in Listing 1.
The block – a rising edge trigger – has one input IN1
and one output OUT .
In our tool, the input IN1 is represented using
three signals: 1) the actual (in this case, binary) value,
IN1, 2) a binary signal indicating signal validity,
IN1 fault, and 3) a binary signal indicating whether
a wire is connected to the input in the block diagram,
IN1 connected.
1 MODULE R TRIG(IN1, IN1 fault, IN1 connected)
VAR
3 prevIN1 : boolean;
DEFINE
5 OUT := !prevIN1 & IN1 & !IN1 fault;





11 IN1 fault : prevIN1;
!IN1 fault : IN1;
13 esac;
Listing 1: NuSMV code for a rising edge trigger element
First, the actual value can be of binary (boolean) or
analogue (integer) type.
Second, the “fault” signal indicates whether the sig-
nal status is set to valid (“OK” or “no fault”) or invalid
(“not OK” or “fault”), based on, e.g., a measurement
failure, or loss of communication. In the application
logic, the validity can then be taken into account in
subsequent processing (Rolls-Royce 2012), for exam-
ple by excluding data from a failed subsystem out of
a majority voting logic (e.g. 2-out-of-4) (Areva NP
2008). (In Listing 1, the output is only set (e.g., a ris-
ing edge is detected) if the last valid input value was
false and the current valid input value is true. The va-
lidity of the input is passed directly to the validity of
output.) Validity processing has been a relevant factor
in about 12% of the design issues that we have iden-
tified (See Table 1).
Finally, the “connected” signal can be used to spec-
ify how unconnected inputs are processed, without
the user having to take such issues into account when
drawing the diagram (in Listing 1, this feature is not
used).
The blocks can also have parameters, in which case
there is only a reference to the value. The associated
graphical element can be specified using SVG (Scal-
able Vector Graphics).
It is also possible to define composite function
blocks, and specify the internal logic by building a
diagram out of other (elementary or composite) func-
tion blocks, enabling a multilevel hierarchy (Pakonen
et al. 2013). Composite blocks are especially useful
for modeling large applications that consist of several
redundant subsystems (or “channels”) replicating the
same logic.
3.3 I&C application logic verification
After the model of the application logic has been con-
structed, verifiable properties are then formalized. In
our tool, the formal properties are written using a sim-
ple text editor. We are in the process of collecting for-
mal properties from our practical projects, in order to
create a user-friendly specification tool that is suited
to the I&C domain (Pakonen et al. 2016).
Based on the model and the properties, MOD-
CHK will then create the corresponding input files for
NuSMV. The basic idea of how the NuSMV model is
generated can be seen by comparing the code in List-
ing 2 with Listing 1 and the function block diagram in
Figure 2. (Since all the block inputs in Figure 2 have
a connection, each “connected” signal has the value
true.)
1 VAR
a, a fault, b, b fault: boolean;
3 NOT1 : NOT(a, a fault, TRUE);
OR1 : OR(NOT1.OUT, NOT1.OUT FAULT, TRUE,
5 b, b fault, TRUE);
R TRIG1 : R TRIG(OR1.OUT, OR1.OUT fault, TRUE);
7 RS1 : (a, a fault, TRUE,
R TRIG1.OUT, R TRIG1.OUT fault, TRUE);
9 DEFINE
c := RS1.OUT;
11 c fault := RS1.OUT fault;
Listing 2: NuSMV code for the function block diagram in Fig-
ure 2
If NuSMV responds that a property is false, the
counterexample is then transformed by MODCHK
to a 2D animation that the user can replay back and
forth. Colors, line styles, and numerical monitors are
used to visualize the values of model variables at each
time step. As an example, in Figure 1, there are four
less-than blocks, and a 2-out-of-4 voting block. Since
the first analogue signal has the value 5, the output
of the first less-than block is true (thick, red wire).
The second analogue signal has the value 0, also be-
low the limit, but this signal is invalid (dashed wire).
There are two true votes received by the voting block,
but the invalid signal is not counted, so the output re-
mains false (thin, black wire).
There are certain limitations (Pakonen et al. 2014)
due to both our modeling approach and the under-
lying model checker NuSMV. Since the model is, in
essence, a fairly straightforward FSM, complex con-
trol algorithms (e.g., PID) cannot be analyzed. Both
the modeling of time (Lahtinen et al. 2012) and the
discretization of analogue data are of particular con-
cern, since the analyst must often resort to ad hoc
“tweaking” in order to avoid state space explosion.
Thankfully, direct errors made in either the model or
in specifying the properties are very often revealed
Figure 1: Partial screen capture showing counterexample visual-
ization in the MODCHK tool
through the resulting counterexamples (Pakonen et al.
2014). In general, our approach is validated by suc-
cessful practical experience, as demonstrated by the
findings presented in Section 5.
3.4 Related work
A lot of the research on I&C model checking has fo-
cused on the automatic generation of the model based
on standard programmable logic controller (PLC) lan-
guages – especially the IEC 61131-3 (e.g., (Ovat-
man et al. 2016), (Pavlovic and Ehrich 2010), (Yoo
et al. 2009), (Adiego et al. 2015)) – or, in the case of
FPGAs, directly based on hardware description lan-
guages like VHDL (De´harbe et al. 1998).
Another key research topic is user-friendly prop-
erty specification. A popular collection of property
specification patterns was published by Dwyer et al.
(1999). Domain specific patterns have been suggested
by, e.g., Campos and Machado (2009). Different
graphical specification languages are listed in (Autili
et al. 2007) and (Pakonen et al. 2016). Ljungkrantz
et al. (2014) have collected formal industry require-
ments in order to develop a specification language
suited for control engineering.
4 FORMAL SAFETY PROPERTIES
Requirement specification documents do not typically
contain statements such as “there shall never be a spu-
rious actuation”. Such statements might be considered
self-evident, or omitted due to the difficulty in their
verification. In any case, an analyst performing formal
verification must take specific care in addressing spu-
rious actuation. For many properties that capture a de-
sired (“good”) behavior, there exist one or more com-
plimentary properties that capture unintended (“bad”)
behavior.
Let us consider a common type of property: “a
request shall lead to a response”, which can be writ-
ten in LTL as:
G(request→ response) (1)
Note that (1) is actually safety property. It expresses
a “good thing”, but the response is required immedi-
ately rather than eventually, and a finite counterexam-
ple is sufficient for demonstrating that the property
does not hold. We can also rewrite (1) using the log-
ically equivalent form: G¬(request ∧ ¬response).
The counterexample would obviously contain a “bad”
state where the request holds but the response is not
true.
However, (1) holds in a scenario where response
is true but request is not. In order to address spurious
actuation, let us turn (1) around to state: “a response
implies that there is a request”, or:
G(response→ request) (2)
The equivalent form is now G¬(response ∧
¬request): “there shall never be a scenario where
response holds but request is not true”. The coun-
terexample will then accordingly reveal a scenario
leading to a spurious actuation.
In (1), we expect that the reaction is immediate, but
there is often a delay before the response is expected.
In that case, we can formulate a liveness property: “a
request shall eventually lead to a response”, or:
G(request→ F response) (3)
In order to address spurious actuation, the counter-
part safety property for (3) is:
G(response→ O request) (4)
If past temporal operators cannot be used,
(4) can be rewritten using the far less intuitive
but equivalent (Pradella et al. 2003) expression
¬(¬request U (response ∧ ¬request)), or based
on the “Precedence” (Dwyer et al. 1999) pattern:
(G¬response) ∨ (¬response U request).
If it is known exactly after how many time steps
response should be true, the “good” property can be
stated using (nested) X operators, e.g., for two time
steps:
G(request→ X(X response)) (5)
The spurious actuation property that is complimen-
tary to (5) can be stated using (nested) Y operators.
Again, for two time steps:
G(response→ Y(Y request)) (6)
The formulas above exemplify why, as stated in
(Benedetti and Cimatti 2003), Y and O are the “tem-
poral duals” of X and F, respectively.
Note also that if (2) or (6) is true, (4) is also true.
Likewise: if (1) or (5) is true, (3) is also true.
Out of the 1079 formal properties we have col-
lected from our practical projects (Pakonen et al.
2016), 2.9% are of the type (3), and 1.9% are of the
type (4). Since (1) and (2) have the same logical con-
struct, we cannot distinguish between them, but their
joint share is at 59.9% of all properties.
5 PRACTICAL EVALUATION
5.1 List of identified design issues
We have collected data on the design issues we have
identified using model checking in practical customer
projects for several customers between the years 2008
and 2016. A design issue, in this context, means that
the analysis revealed a practical example of a poten-
tial scenario, where a certain chain of events leads to
the I&C system application logic ending up in a state
that was contrary to a stated functional requirement.
The data is presented in Table 1. In addition to a
short, generalized description, for each design issue,
we state whether the issue had certain characteristics
(e.g., whether it was a spurious actuation scenario), as
well as whether the logic that was analyzed contained
some design elements that typically introduce com-
plexity. (The ordering of the issues in Table 1 is based
on these characteristics, rather than, e.g., the time of
discovery.)
The reader should note that the issues are about a
single (sub)system not acting according to its stated
requirement in some scenario, however unlikely that
scenario is. We wish to emphasize that: 1) we do
not discuss the actual safety relevance of the issues,
which, for any issue, may be insignificant and/or
purely theoretical, 2) each system has been consid-
ered in isolation – without accounting for, e.g., the
characteristics of the controlled process – and any is-
sue might therefore be practically irrelevant in the ac-
tual context of these systems.
5.2 A practical example
As an example, let us consider one of the identi-
fied design issues that resulted in spurious actuation
(namely, issue 4 in Table 1).
The verified application logic consisted of tens of
function blocks, out of which have selected the ones
that are needed for reproducing the scenario. An ab-
stracted and modified diagram composed of these
blocks can be found in Figure 2.
In this modified logic, we have two inputs, a and
b, one output c, and four function blocks: NOT, OR,
a rising edge trigger (see also Listing 1), and a Set-
Reset flip-flop memory (with priority on the reset
side).
Exemplar functional requirements for the logic in-
clude r1: “If b is false and a is true, c shall be true”,
r2: “If b changes to true, c shall be false”, and r3: “If a
changes to false, c shall be false”. Formalizing to LTL
(omitting, for simplicity, the validity processing), we
get p1: G((¬b∧ a)→ c), p2: G(¬b∧Xb→ X¬c), and
p3: G(a∧X¬a→X¬c). Furthermore, we can specify
that spurious actuation should not occur, by stating ps:
G(c→ (¬b∧ a)).
Verification results indicate that p1 and p2 are true,
but p3 and ps are false. The model checker returns a
Figure 2: Example logic
(finite) counterexample, depicted in Figure 3. From
the counterexample, we can see that if the falling
edges of both a and b signals occur at the exact same
time (processing cycle), then the output of the OR
block is never false (since (a ∧ ¬b) is never true in
this scenario). Therefore, no rising edge will ever oc-
cur to reset the c signal. Since c remains true while a
is false, spurious actuation occurs.
It would be challenging – although not impossible
– to identify the issue using testing or simulation, be-
cause 1) the scenario involves two separate events oc-
curring at the exact same time, and 2) b being true
while c is false is a counter-intuitive circumstance in
the actual context (as the “purpose” of b is to reset c).
Figure 3: Counterexample for properties p3 and ps
5.3 Analysis of the data
The obvious conclusion based on the data in Table 1
is that model checking is an effective verification
method for analyzing spurious actuation of I&C sys-
tems, by revealing design issues that might cause the
application logic to inadvertently actuate a function.
37% of the 40 design issues we have detected were
related to spurious actuation scenarios.
Almost all (with the exception of just two) identi-
fied issues depended upon at least one of the follow-
Table 1: List of generalized design issues identified with model checking.
Issue characteristics Elements in the design
Generalized description spu. fro. sev. tim. ope. val. mem. del. fb.
1. Short signal pulses interfere with a test logic and lead to actuation. m m m m m m
2. Test signal stored in delay block leads to spurious actuation after test. m m m m
3. Test signal stored in memory leads to spurious actuation after test. m m m
4. A reset signal is ignored, if it arrives at a specific time. m m m m
5. Due to maintenance activity, a signal remains set without a cause. m m m m m
6. Due to maintenance activity, a signal is spuriously set. m m m m
7. Invalid data on start up, improper operator action lead to actuation. m m m m m m
8. Spurious actuation commands are given on system start up. m m
9. Two consecutive commands lead to an overtly long actuation signal. m m m
10. Overlapping commands lead to an overtly long actuation signal. m m m
11. Conflicting actuation commands are sent. m m m
12. Invalid signals trigger conflicting commands. m m
13. Conflicting inputs trigger conflicting commands. m
14. A functional requirement is incorrect. m
15. A safety command is given without valid actuation criteria. m m m
16. Uncharacteristic inputs lead to inhibition of safety commands. m m m m
17. Configuration of delays means that a signal is blocked. m m
18. Configuration of delays means that a signal is blocked. m m m
19. After fluctuating inputs, operator can perform a forbidden action. m m m m
20. Fluctuating input data leads to the incorrect operational state. m m m m
21. Conflicting internal variables are set on fluctuating input data. m m m
22. Redundant systems can be inhibited at the same time. m m m m m
23. A lower priority signal overrules a higher priority one. m
24. Due to maintenance activity, a safety function is inhibited. m m m m
25. Due to maintenance activity, an actuator is inhibited. m m m m
26. A lower priority signal overrules a higher priority one. m
27. If input signals are on during start up, a safety function is inhibited. m
28. Redundant systems can be inhibited at the same time. m m m m
29. A test mode can only be deactivated via a wrong mechanism. m m m
30. On conflicting input data, no operational state is selected. m m m
31. Conflicting operational modes selected on fluctuating input data. m m m m
32. An alarm can be acknowledged before it is received. m m m
33. At system start up, an actuation command is inhibited. m
34. A functional requirement on timing is technically incorrect. m
35. Fluctuating inputs lead to short actuation command bursts. m
36. A safety command is inhibited on system start up. m m
37. Very rapidly fluctuating commands are sent to an actuator. m
38. Very rapidly fluctuating commands are sent to an actuator. m
39. A safety command is inhibited after a delay. m
40. Signal validity processing fails. m
% 37 7.3 17 42 32 12 54 51 17
spu. = Spurious actuation
fro. = The logic is permanently frozen to an unwanted state (requires system restart to resolve).
sev. = The interaction of several systems is needed to reproduce the scenario.
tim. = The scenario involves very exact timing of events.
ope. = The scenario involves human operator actions.
val. = Signal validity processing is relevant to the scenario.
mem. = Memory components (e.g., flip-flop switch blocks) are used in the logic.
del. = Delay components are used in the logic.
fb. = Feedback loops are used in the logic.
ing elements being used in the logic design:
1. A memory element, such as a flip-flop switch
or latch. Notably, a block that is not necessarily
a memory element by definition can in practice
serve as one, if, e.g., its processing is based on
the last valid value. Relevant in 54% of the find-
ings.
2. A delay element, or timed element, which also
serves as a type of memory. Delay elements are
often used in I&C systems, due to, e.g., the dy-
namic characteristics of the processes being con-
trolled (Pakonen et al. 2016). Relevant in 51% of
the findings.
3. A feedback loop, which also introduces a delay
element out of necessity, since the processing or-
der the blocks in the loop needs to be made ex-
plicit. Relevant in 17% of the findings.
4. Detailed validity processing in element(s) was
relevant in 12% of the findings.
35% of the issues depended on more than one of
the above-mentioned elements being used in the same
logic.
One of the strengths of function block diagrams as
a programming language is that it is relatively easy to
understand the “flow” of processing from the inputs to
the outputs. Notably, elements such as memory or de-
lay blocks or feedback loops interfere with this flow,
making it more difficult to assess the logic.
Other recurring features of the scenarios were:
1. 42% of the issues involved exact timing of ex-
ternal events, e.g., independent events occurring
on the same processor cycle. Even with discrete-
time model checking, detailed timing can be an-
alyzed.
2. 32% of the issues involved human user actions,
typically personnel (operation or maintenance)
doing something ill-advised and/or ill-timed.
3. 17% of the issues required the interaction be-
tween several systems for the problem to oc-
cur. Analyzing the systems in isolation would not
have revealed the issue.
4. 7% of the scenarios resulted in the a process sig-
nal freezing permanently on some fixed state (re-
quiring, e.g., system restart for recovery).
It would also be interesting to find out the fre-
quency of detected issues per analyzed system, or in
more detail: how common was it for a logic that used,
e.g., a feedback loop, to contain a design issue? How-
ever, such analysis is hard, since it is difficult to com-
pare between systems that might have different ratio-
nale for breaking the design down into applications,
functions, sheets, etc.
It should also be noted that usually, the designs that
were analyzed had already undergone a verification
and validation (V&V) process using other, more con-
ventional methods. Accordingly, (since spurious actu-
ation scenarios are harder to analyze than “failure to
actuate” (Authe´n et al. 2016),) it is likely that spurious
scenarios are over-represented in our data, in the sense
that other issues had more likely already been identi-
fied and corrected. I.e., the share of potential design
issues related to spurious actuation is not necessarily
as large as our data would suggest.
5.4 Topics for further research
In this paper, we have only considered spurious ac-
tuation caused by issues in application logic design.
There is also the need for system-level analysis, cov-
ering failures of I&C hardware and equipment, as
well as actions of operators. Probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA) can be used to assess the plant level ef-
fects of spurious actuation from any given source,
for example hot shorts caused by a power or I&C
cable fire (Authe´n et al. 2016). On the other hand,
PRA cannot be used to analyze application logic in
detail. Work is therefore underway to create a safety
assessment approach that integrates PRA with model
checking (Lahtinen and Bjo¨rkman 2016). An inte-
grated approach could be used to, e.g., verify the
fault-tolerance of a system.
Complexity measures have been proposed for iden-
tifying the parts of I&C software that warrant more
detailed inspection. Simensen et al. (2009) suggest a
method based on different white-box and black-box
measures for individual function blocks, and a metric
for assessing the interconnection complexity of block
diagrams. Tyrva¨inen et al. (2016) suggest a simpler
method based on the number of feedback loops and
complex function blocks, connections between blocks
on a signal path, etc. Complexity of function blocks in
the latter method is based on model checking experi-
ence (Lahtinen et al. 2012), and the authors list simi-
lar elements as in Section 5.3. Our data could be used
to validate and further develop such complexity mea-
sures, especially if the design elements behind issues
we list in Table 1 were characterized in more detail.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The difficulty in analyzing spurious actuation is tied
to the problem of achieving 100% test coverage. The
strength of model checking is that exhaustive cover-
age provides proof that something “bad” can not hap-
pen, in addition to proving that something “good” will
always happen. Our practical experience in the nu-
clear industry proves that issues in I&C application
logic design that might lead to spurious actuation can
be identified with model checking. In fact, to the best
of our knowledge, it is the only truly effective method
available.
Still, the analyst using model checking has to take
specific care that spurious actuation is properly con-
sidered, since the requirement specification docu-
ments (serving as the starting point for property for-
malization) might not explicitly address unwanted
functionality. For any desired (“good”) property, there
might be several complimentary properties that deal
with unintended (“bad”) behavior.
A key obstacle for the wider adoption of for-
mal verification methods is the perceived cost. With
the development of practical, user-friendly, domain-
specific tools, that cost can be alleviated, and the obvi-
ous advantages of model checking become very hard
to dismiss. The alternative might be an accident wait-
ing to happen.
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